Abstract. Forecasting, in general, has been described as an unavoidable yet impossible task.
The rock and the hard place: Forecasting's irony
T h e h i g h l y -r e s p e c t e d d e m o g r a p h e r , N a t h a n Keyfitz, frames well the twop a r t irony confronting all o f us who w a n t to p r o v i d e a description of the future. T h e first p a r t (the rock) is that ' N u m b e r s p r o v i d e the rhetoric of our a g e . . , b u t to forecast in the sense o f m a k i n g an e s t i m a t e that will turn o u t to coincide with w h a t is actually going to h a p p e n is b e y o n d h u m a n capacity' (Keyfitz 1987: 235) . T h e second p a r t of this irony (the h a r d place) is that ' F o r e c a s t i n g (is) impossible yet u n a v o i d a b l e ' (Keyfitz 1987: 236) .
F o r e c a s t s m u s t b e d o n e in the m o d e r n w o r l d and, m o r e o v e r , m u s t be in the f o r m of n u m b e r s . Y e t , the f o r e c a s t e d n u m b e r s invariably turn out to b e different than the n u m b e r s that actually h a p p e n . P e r h a p s the real irony is found in the fact that the social ' a u t h o r i t y ' i m p a r t e d to these forecasts by users is itself constantly t h r e a t e n e d by the p r e s e n c e of the very n u m b e r s that give it this authority. W h y ? B e c a u s e the f o r e c a s t e d ' n u m b e r s ' that are invariably accorded a high degree of precision inexorably reveal their inevitable imprecision when the 'numbers' forming the actuality finally take shape and the 'numbers' comprising the forecast's errors are precisely measured.
Of course, forecasters know that their forecasts wilt have errors and that there are different levels of accuracy expectations for different types of forecasts. The expectations among demographers depend mostly on the size of the population and the length of the forecast horizon (Murdock et al. 1984; Murdock et al. 1989; Smith 1987; Smith & Sincich 1990 , 1992 Stoto 1983; Swanson & Beck 1994; Swanson & Tayman 1994; Tayman 1996) . To a large degree this holds true for informed users of population forecasts as well. Nonetheless, the vast majority of the forecast evaluation literature is focused on accuracy as the major criterion and we argue that this has contributed to what is, in fact, the normative expectation for judging the adequacy of a given forecast -its accuracy (Starr 1987) .
Unfortunately, this expectation has also served to support the demand on the part of many users that forecasts meet standards of accuracy that exceed those commonly accepted as reasonable by experienced forecasters. As an analogue, consider what has happened in the USA in regard to the decennial census between 1970 and 1990. The evaluations of these census counts focused on net undercount errors by geographic and socio-demographic strata (Robinson et al. 1991 ; US Bureau of the Census 1973 Census , 1982 . Given that these census counts have been very accurate and, moreover, are generally believed to have improved in accuracy between 1970 and 1990, it is clear that what are perceived to be 'acceptable' levels of error among professional demographers are not 'acceptable' for many 'stakeholders'. To a large degree this highly-charged situation is also the result of the attention given to accuracy as a major 'evaluation criterion' -the US Bureau of the Census's diligent research reports on census errors largely served to focus public attention on error levels at the expense of other important evaluation criteria. The current level of contentiousness and dispute affecting the 'accuracy' of the decennial census represents a situation that we believe is important for forecasting to avoid. We argue, therefore, that the use of a criterion like 'utility' should be included in forecast evaluations along with accuracy criteria. In this paper we attempt to show that adding this criterion will change the normative expectations regarding what forecasts should achieve in a manner that enhances forecasting, reduces stress levels on forecasters, and avoids trivializing the evaluation process.
Forecasting and job-related stress
For demographers, the full import of forecasting's two-part irony is not always immediately grasped, partly because errors can be measured only a few years after a census or a current estimate is available and partly because the membership in the 'significant user' audience changes frequently. Yet, even without grasping the full import, most demographers who forecast
